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INTRODUCTION 
Master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) are little-known entity types 
that are growing at a prolific rate in the United States as a result of the 
ongoing “shale boom” being experienced in Texas, North Dakota, 
Wyoming, and Pennsylvania.
1
  As of February 1, 2014, there were at least 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2015; B.A., Kinesiology, Rice 
University, 2008.  The author thanks Professor William Bratton for his support and 
insightful comments in developing this Comment, as well as Bryn Sappington, Scarlet 
McNellie, Matthew DeArman, and Benjamin Ratliff of Norton Rose Fulbright for their 
helpful input.  He also thanks the members of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Business Law for their editorial assistance in preparing this Comment for publication.  
Finally, he wishes to thank his lovely wife, Kristen, for her unconditional love and 
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 1.  See, e.g., Matthew Rocco, U.S. Shale Boom Drives Record Oil-Related Exports, 
FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2014/01/09/us-shale-
boom-drives-refined-product-exports/ (explaining the positive effect that access to “lower-
cost crude from shale plays like Eagle Ford in Texas and North Dakota’s Bakken” has had 
on domestic refiners and U.S. exports); Ken Silverstein, Shale Gas Boom at ‘Tip of 
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127 of these publicly traded energy partnerships with a market 
capitalization of about $445 billion.
2
  Proving this point, as reported by an 
October 2013 article in The Economist, MLPs accounted for an astounding 
twenty eight percent of the equity raised among listed companies in 2012.
3
  
The article referred to MLPs as one of multiple entity types considered to 
be a “distorporation,” or those entities qualifying as pass-throughs for tax 
purposes.
4
 
The need for infrastructure growth in the wake of the shale boom and 
the accessibility to capital markets which MLPs provide make MLP 
governance a hot-button topic.  Certainly, the most attractive characteristic 
about MLPs to investors is also the most important one for growing the 
entities’ asset bases — pass-through taxation.  MLPs’ avoidance of entity-
level taxation gives them a competitive advantage over C Corporations in 
that they can afford to pay a higher price for acquisitions or may realize 
greater net cash flow from an acquisition at the same price due to their 
reduced tax burden.
5
  However, to exploit this advantage, MLPs must have 
access to affordable capital. 
To summarize, the purpose of this Comment is to answer two 
questions:  (1) Is the conventional MLP governance structure still the most 
appropriate form for publicly-traded energy partnerships in scope of cost of 
capital concerns?; and (2) What is the ideal method of keeping MLPs’ cost 
of capital competitive such that they remain attractive investment vehicles 
for equity investors and maintain their steady growth for pre-existing 
interest holders?  Considering the foregoing interrogatories, this Comment 
 
Iceberg,’ FORBES (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:55 AM), http://onforb.es/17wPrtd (asserting that the 
Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania “accounts for three-fourths of the growth in the nation’s 
production.”). 
 2.  See MLP SCREENER, ALERIAN, http://www.alerian.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
Energy-MLP-Universe.xls (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (providing a list of the “Energy 
Publicly Traded Partnership Universe” as of February 1, 2014); WELLS FARGO SECURITIES 
MLP PRIMER FIFTH EDITION: A GUIDE TO EVERYTHING MLP – OCT. 31, 2013, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF PUBLICLY TRADED P’SHIPS, at 31, available at 
http://www.naptp.org/documentlinks/Investor_Relations/WF_MLP_Primer_V.pdf 
[hereinafter WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER] (detailing the investment considerations to be 
made when considering MLPs). 
 3.  The New American Capitalism: Rise of the Distorporation, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
26, 2013, at 29 [hereinafter Distorporation] (describing the rise of MLPs, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs), Regulated Investment Companies (RICs), and Business 
Development Companies (BDCs) as alternatives to C corporations and these entities’ ability 
to channel capital more aptly to wealth-generating assets). 
 4.  See id. (stating that “[T]he American government has in the past restricted the use 
of such structures.  But these restrictions have eased, and more and more businesses are now 
twisting themselves into forms that allow them to qualify as pass-throughs.  The corporation 
is becoming the distorporation.”). 
 5.  See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing the benefits to the 
sponsor of creating an MLP). 
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will suggest that conventional MLP governance remains the appropriate 
form and, finally, that voluntary reduction of Incentive Distribution Rights 
(“IDRs”) by the general partner to accommodate capital expenditures or 
acquisitions is the optimal method of keeping cost of capital competitive 
for growth purposes.  In exploring this interrelation between an MLP’s 
governance structure and cost of capital, this Comment will also conclude 
that the recent forays into alternative entity types, alternative partnership 
management, and variable distributions are admirable experiments, but 
inadequate substitutes for the “sponsored” MLP model. 
The Comment will begin in Part I with an overview of the 
conventional MLP model.  After providing a brief history of MLPs in Part 
I(A), an explanation of conventional MLP formation and structure will 
follow in Parts I(B) and I(C), detailing the unique facets of the entity that 
affect its cost of capital.  In Part II, this Comment will build upon the MLP 
framework described in Part I by analyzing the cost of capital implications 
that stem from conventional MLP governance.  This analysis will begin in 
Part II(A) with an examination of incentive distribution rights (“IDRs”) and 
their effect on cost of capital.
6
  Then, the Comment’s focus will turn in Part 
II(B) to the ability of the conventional MLP model to adapt to rising cost of 
capital, often caused by “high splits” in the IDRs.
7
  Part II(C) will argue 
that contractual methods of addressing cost of capital concerns are 
appropriate.  This portion of the Comment will also serve as a review of the 
theory of “uncorporation” promulgated by alternative-entity supporter and 
noted “contractarian” Larry Ribstein.
8
 
I. CONVENTIONAL MLP GOVERNANCE 
A master limited partnership (“MLP”) is a limited partnership whose 
limited partnership interests are publicly-traded and referred to as 
 
 6.  For an explanation of IDRs, see infra notes 50–66 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (defining high splits). 
 8.  See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 VILL. L. REV. 125 
(2010) [hereinafter Ribstein, Uncorporation] (describing the ongoing competition between 
corporations and “uncorporate” business forms such as partnerships, limited partnerships, 
and limited liability companies, and the businesses appropriate for “uncorporate” form); 
Larry Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2009) 
[hereinafter Ribstein, Partnership Governance] (examining private equity firms among 
other “uncorporate” structures and how these entities align the interests of interest holders 
with management); Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 
37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927 (2004) (discussing the restrictions on fiduciary duties waivers in 
limited partnership agreements of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act); Larry Ribstein, An 
Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835 (1988) (asserting the economic 
benefits of organization as a limited partnership and the appropriateness of a different 
method of taxation for partnerships versus C corporations). 
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“common units,” which are analogous to common stock in C corporations.
9
  
The major difference, however, is that C corporations are subject to 
“double taxation” by which the entity pays corporate taxes and the 
stockholders pay taxes on dividends, whereas MLPs are exempt from 
entity-level taxation and, as result, pass on all deductions along with the 
taxable income allocable to each unitholder.
10
  It is this characteristic that 
makes holding MLPs attractive to investors, especially those seeking to 
hold assets with high yields and high growth, but capable of shielding them 
from a yearly tax burden.
11
 
A. Origins 
MLPs emerged in the early 1980s, coinciding with the end of 
widespread conglomeration and the advent of the leveraged buyout and 
bust-up of the mid-1980s.
12
  It is widely believed that the first MLP came 
about in 1981 when Apache Petroleum Corporation combined thirty 
drilling and exploration limited partnerships into one “master” limited 
partnership.
13
  To consummate the transaction, each of the individual 
limited partnerships contributed all of their interests into the MLP in 
exchange for limited partnership interests in the MLP — also called a “roll 
up.”
14
  Nowadays, MLPs are typically formed through either “rollout” or 
“acquisition” transactions.
15
 
Though in the beginning MLPs primarily held oil and gas assets, by 
1987 nationally known brands like Burger King and the Boston Celtics had 
reorganized as MLPs, providing the impetus for legislative change.
16
  The 
Revenue Act of 1987
17
 was a major lawmaking development that limited 
the entity-level taxation exemption to only those publicly traded 
 
 9.  See John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471, 
471 (2005) (providing a definitional overview of MLPs).  
 10.  Id. at 472. 
 11.  Id. at 474. 
 12.  See Donna D. Adler, Master Limited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 755, 756–57 
(1988) (describing the origin of MLPs and the types of transactions that create MLPs). 
 13.  Id.; see also J.T. Carpenter, Comment, Master Limited Partnerships Shed a Tier, 
53 S. TEX. L. REV. 381, 383 (2011) (describing the origins of MLPs and the phenomenon of 
MLPs’ limited partners acquiring the general partner as part of a “GP tuck-in” transaction). 
 14.  Adler, supra note 12, at 756–57. 
 15.  A rollout describes a transaction in which the corporate sponsor contributes assets 
to a limited partnership in exchange for partnership interests that it sells into the market.  Id. 
at 757.  Similarly, in an acquisition transaction, the corporate sponsor serves as the general 
partner and sells limited partnership interests to the public.  Id.  With the equity raised, the 
partnership then purchases assets from either the sponsor or a third party.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 757–58. 
 17.  Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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partnerships for which ninety percent or greater of their income represented 
“qualifying income.”
18
  Importantly, qualifying income includes “income 
and gains derived from the exploration, development, mining or 
production, processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines 
transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral 
or natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber)” 
and income realized by sale or rents of real property.
19
  It is for this reason 
that the bulk of MLPs traded publicly today are in some way related to 
natural resources. 
B. Structuring the Entity: Organization & Offering 
Like a limited partnership, an MLP usually has a general partner, often 
owned by a corporation or limited liability company (LLC), and numerous 
limited partners — also known as unit-holders.
20
  The following structural 
description has been referred to as the “sponsored MLP model” by at least 
one practitioner.
21
  In this model, the “sponsor” of the MLP organizes the 
limited partnership, almost invariably in Delaware,
22
 and serves as the 
general partner, retaining at most a two-percent ownership interest in the 
MLP.
23
  In many cases, the sponsor is a publicly traded corporation 
operating in the oil and gas space, namely exploration and production 
(“E&P”).  The “sponsor” may hold the general partnership interests itself 
 
 18.  See I.R.C. § 7704(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (defining qualifying income); see also 
I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (stipulating that a publicly traded partnership 
“meets the gross income requirements of this paragraph for any taxable year if 90 percent or 
more of the gross income of such partnership for such taxable year consists of qualifying 
income” and will be exempted from entity-level taxation); Goodgame, supra note 9, at 472 
(explaining qualifying income and providing an example of the effect of exemption from 
entity-level taxation). 
 19.  I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(C)–(E) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  “Mineral or natural resource” 
in the context of I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E) is defined as “any product of a character with 
respect to which a deduction for depletion is allowable under section 611.”  I.R.C. § 
7704(d)(1)(G) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  These products include those extracted from 
“mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber.”  I.R.C. § 611(a) (2006). 
 20.  See Philip H. Peacock, Master Limited Partnerships: At The Crossroads?, 4 TEX. J. 
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 397, 400 (2008) (detailing the formation and structure of MLPs); 
Goodgame, supra note 9 at 473. 
 21.  See John Goodgame, New Developments in Master Limited Partnership 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 81, 83 (2012) (defining the traditional governance model of 
MLPs as the “sponsored MLP model”). 
 22.  See Peacock, supra note 20, at 398 (explaining that “MLPs are typically organized 
in Delaware because Delaware has a very flexible limited partnership statute that, among 
other things, provides that the liability of the general partner to the limited partners may be 
limited by contract.”). 
 23.  Id. at 400; Goodgame, supra note 9, at 473. 
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or through a special purpose entity with few assets.
24
 
Oftentimes the sponsor contributes the initial assets to the MLP
25
, and 
then sells the common units (i.e., limited partnership interests) into the 
market through an initial public offering — a “rollout” transaction.
26
  Such 
a transaction may also be referred to as a “dropdown,” which better 
describes the transaction from the sponsor’s point of view.
27
  Figure 1 
illustrates a structural depiction of a dropdown transaction, below.  This 
transactional setup involves a Master Contribution Agreement between the 
sponsor-parent and the MLP detailing the assets being sold, the 
consideration, and the method of financing the consideration.  In the case 
of a midstream dropdown (i.e., a pipeline), the sponsor-parent will almost 
invariably still need the use of the assets for transporting its E&P 
extractions.  Recognizing this, the MLP bonds the sponsor’s use of the 
pipeline under a through-put agreement, typically twenty years in duration 
or longer, requiring the sponsor to send a minimum amount of extracted 
product through the pipeline over the life of the agreement.  This through-
put agreement serves as assurance to the MLP and its unitholders that the 
recently-acquired midstream asset will continue to generate significant 
revenue sufficient to justify the price paid and increase investor 
distributions in the short- and long-term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 473–74. 
 25.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 400. 
 26.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text (defining a rollout transaction). 
 27.  Peacock, supra note 20 at 409. 
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FIGURE 1: THE MECHANICS OF A DROPDOWN TRANSACTION
28
 
 
 
 
As the sponsor, the modus operandus for creating an MLP is primarily 
to monetize assets.  A “sale” to an MLP generates cash for reinvestment in 
the sponsor’s other projects that may not constitute “qualifying income” or 
that may yield a higher return, and the sponsor receives a premium price 
for its asset because the MLP is not taxed at the entity level.
29
  A beneficial 
dropdown transaction unlocks the greater value of assets generating 
qualifying income by transferring them to an MLP because the MLP can 
pay more for the asset since the cash flows it is buying the asset for will 
only be taxed once, namely not at the entity level.  If a new MLP is created, 
the consideration for the assets is partnership interests, which are converted 
into cash when some of the units are marketed to the public through an 
IPO.
30
  In the case of a pre-existing MLP, the sponsor may transfer the 
assets in exchange for cash secured from the capital markets by the MLP 
through debt and equity offerings.
31
 
At this point, it is important to tease out the reasoning behind why 
sponsors form MLPs in the first place.  Aside from the obvious motive of 
monetizing assets, an MLP can quite clearly function as a funding 
mechanism for the sponsor.  The sponsor is potentially able to avoid an 
equity offering of its own by monetizing “qualifying income” assets 
 
 28.  See Figure of How Dropdowns Work, SEEKING ALPHA, http://static.cdn-
seekingalpha.com/uploads/2014/3/13/20371061-13947623576515193-MLPData.jpg (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2014) (utilizing diagram created by Morgan Stanley Research to explain the 
basics of a dropdown). 
 29.  See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 388 (asserting the reasons why sponsors choose to 
create MLPs). 
 30.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 409–10. 
 31.  Id.; see supra Fig. 1 (depicting this transaction). 
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through a dropdown transaction.  In doing so, it finances its own NPV-
positive projects at a cost of capital it otherwise could not access through 
the capital markets.  As an added benefit, the sponsor continues to receive 
cash flow from the dropped-down assets thanks to its ownership of the 
general partner, and in turn the incentive distribution rights, which in some 
cases can send 20% of the MLP’s cash flow to the sponsor.
32
  Alternatively, 
if the sponsor does not have any NPV-positive investments, it can use the 
cash generated by the dropdown to buy back stock at a lower cost of capital 
than if it utilized retained earnings, thereby driving up return on equity.  In 
any event, it is clear that sponsors can use MLPs as both a steady source of 
income (e.g., IDRs) and a financing arm. 
The power of the general partner in an MLP is one of the most 
defining characteristics of “sponsored MLP” governance and differs 
dramatically from traditional management control in a corporation.
33
  
Limited partners have no role in the operations and management of the 
MLP.  Though the MLP may have a board of directors, the directors are 
merely place-fillers since they are generally directors of the general partner 
appointed by the MLP’s sponsor.
34
  Because the sponsor often has a vested 
interest in maintaining control over the assets it contributes to an MLP, it is 
averse to allowing a third party to control the assets.
35
  For example, a 
sponsor in the oil and gas exploration business may contribute a pipeline to 
an MLP at the time of organization.  However, because the sponsor relies 
upon the pipeline to transport the product it extracts, it is in its best interest 
to maintain control over it so as to take advantage of synergies and prevent 
competition between itself and the MLP.
36
 
The sponsored MLP is entirely owned by the parent-sponsor until 
the IPO of the common units.
37
  Furthermore, the MLP typically does not 
directly own assets, but rather serves as a holding company for subsidiary 
LLCs, which own the assets.
38
  On the IPO date, the parent-sponsor 
commonly sells less than a quarter of the common units into the market, 
intentionally retaining the remainder.
39
 
Stockholders in corporations and unitholders in MLPs have similar 
voting rights.  For MLP unitholders, these rights are often limited to 
 
 32.  See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text (detailing the IDR mechanism); see 
also infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing MLPs in the high splits). 
 33.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 400 (“The general partner of an MLP has exclusive 
control over the operations and activities of the MLP.”); see Goodgame, supra note 9, at 491 
(opining on the exclusion of the common unitholders from MLP decision-making). 
 34.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 491. 
 35.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 400. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 401. 
 39.  Id. 
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removal of the general partner, merger or consolidation of the MLP, sale of 
all or substantially all of the assets, dissolution, and actions prohibited by 
the partnership agreement.
40
  Though these rights seem ostensibly similar to 
shareholder voting rights under Delaware General Corporate Law, they are 
illusory because MLPs are controlled by their general partners/sponsors, 
who typically hold a control block, allowing them to forgo annual meetings 
and to merely appoint the board.
41
  Thus, one practitioner has suggested 
that the only “rational action that a dissatisfied unitholder can take is to 
vote with her wallet and sell her common units.”
42
 
C. Distinguishing Features of MLPs 
With the foregoing simple explanation of the “sponsored MLP” 
structure, MLPs become complicated with the introduction of four 
distinguishing features of MLPs:  (1) minimum quarterly distributions and 
obligation to distribute all “available cash”; (2) subordinated units; (3) 
incentive distribution rights (“IDRs”); and (4) uniquely favorable tax 
treatment. 
Whereas dividend declarations or retentions are matters of board 
discretion in corporations, MLPs are constrained by a kind of dividend 
preference.  Common unitholders have an expectation of receiving a 
quarterly distribution, dubbed the “minimum quarterly distribution.”
43
  This 
amount is stipulated in the partnership agreement and must be paid to the 
common unitholders before any distribution is made to the units retained by 
the sponsor.
44
  Further, if for any reason the minimum quarterly distribution 
is not distributed in full to the common unitholders in a given quarter, the 
arrearage must be paid in addition to the minimum quarterly distribution in 
the successive quarter(s) until the common units are made whole.
45
  This 
provision ties in with the concept of subordinated units (i.e., the sponsor’s 
 
 40.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 491–93 (examining the partnership agreement of 
Enbridge LP to determine the voting rights of limited partners). 
 41.  Id. at 493. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 402. 
 44.  Id.; see PHILLIPS 66 PARTNERS LP PROSPECTUS (FORM 424B4) A-11 (2013) 
[hereinafter PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS] (defining “Minimum Quarterly Distribution” as 
“$0.2125 per Unit per Quarter” in the First Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited 
Partnerships disclosed in connection with the MLP’s offering of 16,425,000 common units). 
 45.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 476 (detailing a similar provision in Enterprise 
Product Partners, LP’s partnership agreement); see also PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 
44, at A-46 (stipulating in Section 6.4(a)(ii) that “cumulative common unit arrearage[s]” 
must be paid to the unitholders “less the General Partner’s Percentage Interest” after the 
unitholders have received that quarter’s Minimum Quarterly Distribution). 
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retained units are junior to the publicly held units for a time).
46
  It is 
believed that minimum quarterly distributions were created in response to 
underwriters’ desire to increase the marketability of MLP common units.
47
 
Over the early life of an MLP after its IPO, the partnership 
agreement provides for favorable treatment of the common units held by 
the public as compared with those held by the sponsor.  As noted earlier, 
the sponsor typically retains a majority of the limited partner interests (i.e., 
common units) after an IPO.
48
  However, in order to assure equity investors 
of the minimum quarterly distribution, sponsors have traditionally provided 
for a “preference” or “subordination” period in the partnership agreement 
to ensure a minimum yield for these initial investors.
49
  During this 
subordination period, which typically lasts three years,
50
 the subordinated 
units held privately “are not entitled to receive any cash distributions unless 
and until the common units have been paid the minimum quarterly 
distribution in full, and any arrearages in the payment of the minimum 
quarterly distribution to the common units have been eliminated.”
51
  
Furthermore, during this period, it is common to limit the amount of 
additional equity that the MLP can issue, especially securities senior to the 
common units.
52
  The subordinated units are converted into common units 
following the subordination period.
53
 
These minimum quarterly distributions are to come from the MLP's 
“available cash.”
54
  Most MLPs require distribution of all available cash to 
 
 46.  See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (discussing subordinated units). 
 47.  Carpenter, supra note 13, at 385. 
 48.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text (stating that sponsors typically sell less 
than a quarter of the common units in an IPO). 
 49.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 476 (describing the subordination period as a time 
when the publicly held common units are given a preferred return to those held by the 
sponsor). 
 50.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 406; see PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at 62 
(setting forth a subordination period extending from the closing date of the offering to 
September 30, 2016, which is a term of approximately three years). 
 51.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 406. 
 52.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 477 (listing the “additional” restrictions protecting 
the yield of the common units during the subordination period). 
 53.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 406. 
 54.  See id. at 402 (simplifying available cash to mean “cash flow less reserves 
established at the discretion of the general partner for items such as capital expenditures, 
operating expenditures (including debt service), and distributions to be made in the 
future.”); see also PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at A-3 (defining “Available 
Cash” as “the sum of . . . all cash and cash equivalents of the Partnership Group . . . on hand 
at the end of such Quarter [and] . . . all or any portion of additional cash and cash 
equivalents . . . resulting from Working Capital Borrowings . . . less . . . the amount of any 
cash reserves established by the General Partner”). 
MCCABE_FINAL (ARTICLE 7).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:56 PM 
2014] MLPS’ COST OF CAPITAL CONUNDRUM 329 
 
the partners on a quarterly basis.
55
  Though the general partner has 
discretion to develop cash reserves for targeted purposes, it is in the general 
partner’s best interest to distribute as much cash as possible to the common 
unitholders due to its holding of IDRs.
56
 
IDRs are easily the most unique facet of MLPs, notwithstanding 
their tax-favored status, and arguably have the greatest implications for cost 
of capital.  IDRs “are a special class of limited partnership interest that 
entitle the holder to an increasing percentage of the cash distributions that 
the MLP pays out to its unitholders as [certain] thresholds are met.”
57
  They 
serve the purpose of aligning the interest of the general partner, which 
typically holds the IDRs, with those of the limited partners (i.e., common 
unitholders).
58
  This structure encourages the MLP to maintain a high 
distribution and incentivizes the general partner to steadily increase the 
distribution by appealing to its self-interest.
59
  For example, in the case of 
Phillips 66 Partners LP, which went public in July 2013,
60
 the partnership 
agreement stipulates an initial minimum quarterly distribution 
($0.2125/unit per quarter)
61
 and then three “target distributions,” which, 
when reached, provide greater shares of the distributions of available cash 
to the general partner as part of the IDRs.
62
  The “First Target Distribution” 
is $0.244375/unit per quarter,
63
 at which point the general partner will 
receive 15% of the total distribution to the common units exceeding 
$0.244375/unit.
64
  The “Second Target Distribution” is $0.265625/unit per 
quarter,
65
 at which point the general partner will receive 25% of the total 
distribution to the common units exceeding $0.265625/unit.
66
  The “Third 
 
 55. Carpenter, supra note 13, at 385; Peacock, supra note 20, at 402; see PHILLIPS 66 
PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at A-45–A-46 (“Within 45 days following the end of each 
Quarter . . . an amount equal to 100% of Available Cash with respect to such Quarter shall 
be distributed . . . by the Partnership to the Partners as of the Record Date selected by the 
General Partner.”). 
 56.  See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text (discussing IDRs). 
 57.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 403. 
 58.  Carpenter, supra note 13, at 387. 
 59.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 477–78 (calling IDRs the “most powerful . . . 
incentive for the general partner contained in MLP partnership agreements”). 
 60.  See Company Overview, PHILLIPS 66 CO., http://www.phillips66.com/EN/ 
about/Company_Overview/Pages/index.aspx [hereinafter Phillips 66] (referencing the 
MLP’s July 2013 IPO containing primarily midstream assets). 
 61.  See supra note 44 (providing the minimum distribution required according to the 
partnership agreement). 
 62.  See PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at A-46–48 (stating the proper 
“distributions of available cash from operating surplus.”). 
 63.  Id. at A-8. 
 64.  Id. at 64–65, A-47. 
 65.  Id. at A-17. 
 66.  Id. at 64–65, A-47. 
MCCABE_FINAL (ARTICLE 7).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:56 PM 
330 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
Target Distribution” is $0.318750/unit per quarter,
67
 at which point the 
general partner will receive 50% of the total distribution to the common 
units exceeding $0.318750/unit.
68
  Table 1, below, from Phillips 66 
Partners LP’s Prospectus provides a breakdown of cash distributions under 
this IDR scheme. 
 
TABLE 1: IDR DISTRIBUTION BREAKDOWN
69
 
 
 
    UNITHOLDERS            GENERAL PARTNER      
MARGINAL PERCENTAGE 
INTEREST IN DISTRIBUTIONS 
Minimum Quarterly 
Distribution 
 $0.2125       98%   2%  
First Target 
Distribution  
above $0.2125   up to $0.244375   98%   2%  
Second Target 
Distribution 
 above $0.244375  up to  $0.265625   85%   15%  
Third Target 
Distribution 
 above $0.265625  up to  $0.318750   75%   25%  
Thereafter  above $0.318750      50%   50%  
 
When distributions reach the point where 50% of any additional 
cash distributed accrues to the general partner under the partnership’s IDR 
provision, an MLP is said to be in the “high splits.”
70
  It is when an MLP 
reaches the high splits that it becomes more difficult to find projects that 
are accretive —those projects that will increase the distribution to 
unitholders — because it must find projects and acquisitions that generate 
twice as much cash flow as the MLP intends to distribute to its unitholders 
as a result of the 50/50 split.
71
  For example, if the MLP wants to increase 
distributions by $0.25 to unitholders, its acquisition must be capable of 
producing additional cash flow of $0.50/unit, since half of the cash flow 
will be directed to the general partner under the 50/50 IDR split.  To 
address this concern, this Comment will argue in Part II(B) that an IDR 
 
 67.  Id. at A-18. 
 68.  Id. at 64–65, A-47. 
 69.  Id. at 65. 
 70.  Peacock, supra note 20, at 404. 
 71.  See id. at 405 (commenting that the high splits of an MLP may actually stunt the 
growth of the entity because public investors are unwilling to purchase the common units 
offered in an equity offering unless the project or acquisition contemplated will be accretive 
to investors in the long run).  This has obvious implications on the cost of capital and the 
permissible capital expenditures that an MLP can make when in the high splits. See infra 
Parts II(A)–(B) (explaining IDRs’ effect on cost of capital and methods of remedying the 
problem created). 
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reset provision in the partnership agreement is a vital and modest corrective 
for high splits’ effect on cost of capital.
72
 
Finally, the tax benefits of MLPs as pass-through entities accrue 
especially to unitholders by enhancing distributions to its partners and 
shielding the majority of distributions from taxes in the short-term.  
Moreover, as referenced in Part I, preferential tax treatment allows the 
MLP to be more competitive in pursuing acquisitions and projects.
73
  The 
MLP’s avoidance of entity-level taxation, 35% in the case of corporations, 
allows it to distribute significantly more to its partners.
74
  This steady return 
may be particularly attractive to investors who are interested in holding the 
units for a long period of time and are seeking a high income relative to the 
price of the unit (i.e., high yield).
75
 
High yields emanate from MLPs’ ability to shield a large portion of 
their yields from taxes.  As a pass-through, MLPs pass each partner “their 
allocable share of the partnership’s income, gains, losses, and deductions, 
including accelerated depreciation and amortization deductions in 
computing their federal income tax liability.”
76
  These distributions to 
partners are generally not taxable, but are rather treated as returns of 
capital, which reduce the common unitholders cost basis in the MLP.
77
  The 
only portion of the cash distribution on which unitholders will be taxed 
concurrently is the “taxable income allocable” from the MLP — the portion 
of the distribution attributable to the MLP’s net income.
78
  It is estimated 
that the ratio of taxable income to distributions is approximately 20%.
79
 In 
other words, the unitholder would pay tax at their marginal rate on 20% of 
the total distribution, while deferring payment of taxes on 80% of the 
distribution until the occurrence of a triggering event (e.g., sale of the units) 
 
 72.  See infra Part II(B) (explaining the mechanics of an IDR reset provision and its 
effect on cost of capital). 
 73.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text (referencing MLPs’ competitive 
advantage over C corporations). 
 74.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 472 (providing an example of the effect of “double 
taxation” by equating $1.54 of MLP income to $2.20 of corporate income in order to 
provide $1 of after-tax income to an equity holder with a marginal tax rate of 35%); 
Peacock, supra note 20, at 407. 
 75.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 474. 
 76.  WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 37. 
 77.  See id. (contrasting distribution from MLP with distribution from a C corporation 
that is treated as a dividend and does not affect basis). 
 78.  Id.; see also Goodgame, supra note 9, at 472 (noting the deferral of income taxes 
for unitholders flowing from the return of capital). 
 79.  WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 37; see also Peacock, supra note 20, 
at 408 (stating that many MLPs estimate the amount of allocable income to partners as 20% 
or less when they go public). 
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to the extent the unitholder’s adjusted basis exceeds the non-taxable 
distribution amount.
80
 
D. Fiduciary Duties 
Whereas broad fiduciary duties are considered the bedrock of 
Delaware corporate law, they are often explicitly excluded from alternative 
entities like MLPs.
81
  Since August 1, 2004, the Delaware Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (“DRULPA”) has permitted the expansion, 
restriction or elimination of fiduciary duties.
82
  The relevant section of the 
DRULPA, section 17-1101(d), states: 
 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other 
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
partnership or to another partner or to another person that 
is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership 
agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the 
partnership agreement; provided that the partnership 
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
83
 
 
Amongst MLPs, the elimination of fiduciary duties has become a common 
practice.
84
  In a September 2012 study of eighty-six “publicly traded non-
corporate business associations” (LLCs and LPs), it was found that over 
 
 80.  WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 37. 
 81.  See generally Goodgame, supra note 9, at 485-87 (describing the divergence 
between the Delaware General Corporate Law and the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act). 
 82.  See id. at 487 n.87 (reasoning that the Delaware legislature possibly amended the 
provision to add terminology permitting elimination of fiduciary duties in response to 
dictum in Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del. 
2002), which concluded that a limited partnership agreement could not eliminate fiduciary 
duties because the statute lacked the word “eliminate”). 
 83.  Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
1101(d) (2010). 
 84.  See generally Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger 
for Investors in Delaware Non-Corporate Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53 
(2013) (examining the provisions of LLC operating agreements and LP agreements for 
publicly traded entities that stipulate special approval provisions for dealing with conflicts 
or eliminate fiduciary duties); Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware 
Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555 
(2012) (discussing the widespread use of fiduciary duty waiver and exculpation provisions 
among alternative entities and the justifications for such contractual provisions). 
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fifty-two percent eliminate fiduciary duties entirely.
85
  Similarly, a June 
2011 study of eighty-five publicly traded firms determined that only ten 
(11.76%) of the firms do not substantially alter default fiduciary duties — 
forty-two (49.41%) “fully waive the fiduciary duties of the firm’s 
managers,” while another thirty-three (38.82%) firms eliminate liability 
stemming from breach of fiduciary duties (88.24% cumulatively).
86
 
Eliminating fiduciary duties in MLPs makes sense for the 
unitholders to the extent that both management and unitholders interests 
can be aligned economically through contract — a “contractarian” 
viewpoint, which will be revisited in Part II(C).
87
  It is alleged that the 
incentives and framework established contractually in the partnership 
agreement can adequately supplant fiduciary duties and, in doing so, 
constrain agency costs that arise from enforcement by “derivative plaintiffs 
and their lawyers who, like corporate managers, may have interests 
different from those of the owners.”
88
  The two contractual provisions of 
MLPs that serve to support this assertion are the minimum quarterly 
distributions and the IDRs.  In the case of minimum quarterly distributions, 
managerial discretion is curbed with regards to retaining cash flow due to 
mandatory distribution of “available cash.”
89
  Similarly, the IDRs 
incentivize the general partner to maximize distributions, which inure to the 
benefit of the limited partners and the general partner, and “likely promote 
proper management of the MLP and its assets.”
90
  The contrary viewpoint 
on IDRs is that such an incentive-based contract may encourage the general 
partner to increase distributions aggressively, ignoring earnings retention, 
to the detriment of long-term value.
91
  Alternatively, it can be argued that 
the general partner gets a disproportionate percentage of firm profits not 
commensurate with its ownership stake, which encourages excessive risk.
92
 
This Comment will maintain in Part II that the contractual 
provisions allowing MLPs to engage in ostensibly interested transactions 
with its sponsor through further dropdowns of assets generating “qualifying 
income,” though questionable under traditional conceptions of the duty of 
 
 85.  See Horton, supra note 84, at 94 (finding that 29.41% of LLCs and 57.97% of LPs 
that are publicly traded feature these elimination provisions). 
 86.  Manesh, supra note 84, at 574. 
 87.  See infra Part II(C) (explaining in greater depth the theory of uncorporation and its 
applicability to MLPs). See generally supra note 8 (referencing the works of noted 
contractarian Larry Ribstein).  
 88.  Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 297. 
 89.  Id. at 290–91. But see Manesh, supra note 84, at 590 (asserting that “the 
disciplinary effects of compelled distributions are dubious given the fact that the managers 
are contractually entitled to determine what constitutes ‘available cash.’”). 
 90.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 479. 
 91.  Manesh, supra note 84, at 591. 
 92.  Id. 
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loyalty, is an important tool in maintaining a competitive cost of capital for 
the firm.  As such, Part II will argue that the “sponsored MLP model” 
remains the entity of choice for cost of capital purposes despite the recent 
experiments with LLCs and GP tuck-ins. 
II. COST OF CAPITAL IN CONVENTIONAL MLPS 
Because the attractiveness of MLPs to investors depends heavily 
upon their maintaining and growing distributions to investors, it is 
paramount that the MLPs have access to capital markets or, at the least, a 
sponsor with a plethora of “qualifying income” assets that can be “dropped 
down” to the MLP.
93
  Intuitively, in order for investors to contribute this 
capital, the contemplated transaction must cost less than the expected return 
— in other words, the rate of return must exceed the MLP’s cost of capital 
to be an accretive investment.
94
  The likelihood of an “acceptable return” is 
heavily determinative of the cost of capital (i.e., the price equity investors 
are willing to pay and the interest rate at which capital is lent).
95
  Another 
significant facet of MLPs that necessitates keeping the cost of capital low is 
the fact that many of them own “steady cash flow” assets — midstream 
assets like pipelines — making it unlikely that the rate of return on the 
acquisition, albeit reliable, would permit an inflated cost of capital.
96
 
Whereas MLPs undoubtedly benefit from their pass-through status 
for cost of capital purposes, it is clear that when the IDRs reach the high 
splits (i.e., 50% of increased cash flow accruing to the sponsor/general 
partner), this cost of capital advantage over C corporations can disappear.
97
  
As such, in the past five years, existing and newly-formed MLPs have tried 
many alternatives to mitigate this apparent roadblock to growth inherent in 
the “sponsored MLP model” of governance.
98
  However, it remains to be 
seen whether the use of alternative entity types has remedied this issue.  If 
the past two years are any indication, the “sponsored MLP model,” 
complete with high-splits IDRs, remains the governance model of choice, 
proving that “the value inherent in owning IDRs appears to outweigh the 
 
 93.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 501–02 (concluding that “the MLP structure 
encourages the general partner to cause the MLP to finance its growth at least in part 
through the raising of capital.”). See generally supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text 
(defining “drop-down” transactions). 
 94.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502; see WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 
28 (commenting that MLPs have typically enjoyed favorable access to capital markets). 
 95.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 104–06 (discussing Wells Fargo’s 
method of estimating an MLP’s cost of capital). 
 98.  See id. at 98 (discussing rationales for differing MLP governance structures). 
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challenges of a higher cost of equity for GP owners.”
99
  This Comment 
reaches the same conclusion in this Part and argues that a contractual 
provision allowing the general partner to reset the IDRs is a most 
appropriate method of reducing an MLP’s cost of capital. 
A. Effect of Incentive Distribution Rights on Cost of Capital 
According to Wells Fargo’s analysis as of the 2nd Quarter of 2013, 
there were twelve MLPs paying 20% or more of their total cash to their 
general partner,
100
 arguably due to their IDRs reaching the 50/50 high-splits 
threshold.  This increased burden has been termed the “GP tax” and is a 
serious impediment to the long-term growth prospects of the MLP.
101
  As 
one author has put it, with an increasing cost of capital and investors' 
enduring desire for greater distributions, “there inevitably comes a moment 
when the two competing realities . . . intersect.”
102
  This intersection is the 
high splits of IDRs. 
In determining the cost of equity for an MLP, Wells Fargo has 
advocated for a calculation that sums:  (1) the forward yield adjusted for 
the general partner’s share of cash flow over the common units’ percentage 
of cash flow, and (2) distribution growth.
103
  By Wells Fargo’s calculations, 
an MLP without IDRs can make investments at eleven to twelve times 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”) 
and still have an asset accretive to the MLP (i.e., an investment which 
increases distributions to unitholders).
104
  By contrast, an MLP with a 
maximum IDR tier of 50% with the same assumptions would only be able 
to pay seven to eight times EBITDA in order to ensure that the investment 
remains accretive over its lifetime.
105
  Assuming an initial cost of equity 
capital (rate of return) of 10% (7% forward yield + 3% distribution 
growth), charting the growth of the cost of equity as a function of the 
increased cash flow to the general partner, an MLP’s required rate of return 
will approximately double as it reaches the high splits (50% IDR).
106
  As a 
 
 99.  See id. (noting that as of October 31, 2013, nineteen of the twenty-four MLPs that 
had completed IPOs since 2012 included a maximum IDR in their structure, with all 
midstream MLP IPOs including a 50% IDR tier). 
 100.  Id. at 97. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Carpenter, supra note 13, at 413. 
 103.  See WELLS FARGO MLB PRIMER, supra note 2, at 104 (calculating the forward 
adjusted cash yield as the next four quarterly distributions, divided by the current unit price, 
and adjusted for the general partner’s share of cash flow). 
 104.  See id. at 105 & Ex. 105 (assuming a yield of 7%, a cost of debt of 7%, and 
distribution growth of 3%). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 105–106 & Ex.106. 
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result, if the MLP wishes to fund an acquisition with new equity, the 
acquired investment must generate cash flow “at least double the aggregate 
current distribution rate on those newly-issued common units” in order to 
be accretive to the new equity investors.
107
 
B. Combating Rising Cost of Capital 
Tactics to combat the rising cost of capital stemming from IDRs 
seemingly fall into two categories.  The first calls for the elimination of 
IDRs through one of the following methods:  (1) the use of another entity 
type (e.g., an LLC) to go public; (2) a “GP tuck-in” transaction; (3) a 
variable distributions provision; or (4) the unilateral elimination of IDRs by 
the general partner.  The other side of the coin contemplates the 
maintenance of IDRs and includes:  (1) general partner subsidies through 
temporary suspension of IDRs; (2) maximum IDR splits of 25% rather than 
50%; or (3) an IDR reset option. 
Action precipitating from cost of capital concerns with the 
“sponsored MLP model” first arose in the early 2000s, possibly in response 
to Enron.
108
  Needless to say, the collapse of Enron led to significant 
discussion and scholarship over incentive structures and pitfalls of modern 
corporate governance.
109
  In the context of MLPs, a push was made for 
“good governance” as determined by market pressures.
110
  The first step 
taken by a few MLPs towards this supposed “market optimal governance” 
involved the unveiling of the “public LLC model.”
111
  Under this structure, 
the LLC would not have a managing member, but would be managed by a 
board of directors elected by the unitholders, which would owe fiduciary 
duties like those owed by directors and officers in Delaware 
corporations.
112
  As with corporations, these LLCs often contain 
exculpatory provisions from duty of care violations, but the duty of loyalty 
remains intact.
113
  Furthermore, the operating agreement of the LLC would 
 
 107.  Goodgame, supra note 9, at 504. 
 108.  See id. at 503 (noting that GulfTerra’s “Independence Initiatives,” which was 
intended to distinguish itself from sponsor El Paso Corporation, occurred shortly after “the 
Enron debacle”). 
 109.  See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275 (2002) (pointing out that the incentive structure of corporate governance 
pervasive during the lead-up to the Enron bankruptcy failed to serve as a meaningful check 
on management and needed overhaul). 
 110.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502 (asserting that investors will shy away from 
MLPs viewed as favoring their sponsors over the interests of their common unitholders). 
 111.  See Goodgame, supra note 21, at 87–88 (describing the November 2004 IPO of 
Copano Energy, LLC). 
 112.  Id. at 88. 
 113.  Id. at 90. 
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not provide for any minimum distributions or incentive-based 
compensation for management.
114
  It may have been believed that by 
making MLPs mirror the governance standards expected of corporations, 
lenders and investors would view them more favorably for purposes of 
extending capital.  There are currently five traded LLCs among publicly 
traded energy partnerships.
115
 
The next method of reducing the cost of capital through IDR 
elimination emerged in 2007 when MarkWest Energy Partners, LP 
purchased its general partner MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. in a merger, 
thereby collapsing the IDRs into the MLP.
116
  The resulting entity instituted 
unitholder elections of the general partner’s board of directors and 
cancelled the IDRs.
117
  Notably, the entities that have undergone these “GP 
tuck-in” transactions have not adopted traditional corporate fiduciary duties 
for their boards.
118
 
Third, and recently attempted by four MLPs that went public in 
2011-2012, an MLP may go public with variable distributions of all 
“available cash” instead of a required minimum quarterly distribution.
119
  
Though the entity still has a general partner who retains control, the general 
partner has a non-economic interest and thus its sole incentive to pay out 
and increase cash distributions “lies in the general partner’s and sponsor’s 
ownership of common units that benefit and suffer alongside those owned 
by the public.”
120
  Finally, and most unlikely, an MLP’s general partner 
may eliminate its IDRs completely of its own accord.
121
 
Conversely, many MLPs have maintained IDRs, but have utilized 
creative methods in attempts to avert the strain that high splits can place on 
the entity’s cost of capital.  The first method is general partner 
subsidization of acquisitions.  This technique involves the general partner’s 
unilateral decision to forgo its contractual IDR payments for a defined or 
indefinite term so that an acquisition is adequately accretive to common 
unitholders.
122
  Secondly, an MLP may amend its partnership agreement to 
reduce its highest level IDR to 25% (i.e. 2% general partner units share & 
 
 114.  See id. at 88 (noting that “the Copano board is incentivized — like the board of any 
other public corporation — by its prospects for re-election.”). 
 115.  WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2. 
 116.  Goodgame, supra note 21, at 91–93. See generally Carpenter, supra note 13 
(discussing the GP tuck-in phenomenon). 
 117.  Goodgame, supra note 21, at 92. 
 118.  Id. at 93. 
 119.  See id. at 95–97 (describing variable distribution MLPs). 
 120.  Id. at 97. 
 121.  See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 96 (mentioning Enterprise 
Product Partners which eliminated its IDR structure completely in 2010). 
 122.  See id. at 100–01 (listing twenty-four general-partner-subsidized transactions 
dating from November 2004–October 2013). 
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23% IDR distribution).  Enterprise Products Partners, LP was seemingly 
the first MLP to make this move when the MLP’s general partner elected to 
cap its distributive share at 25%, reducing it from the status-quo 50% 
threshold under conventional IDRs.
123
  There has been speculation that a 
growth in institutional investors in the MLP market may pressure a move 
towards capping IDRs below their usual 50% share.
124
 
The final method employed by MLPs to reduce cost of capital 
while maintaining IDRs is the IDR reset option.  It is believed that DCP 
Midstream Partners, LP was the first MLP to adopt such a cost of capital 
protection mechanism.
125
  According to Phillips 66 Partners’ Prospectus, 
the rationale for utilizing this reset option is “in order to facilitate 
acquisitions or internal growth projects that would otherwise not be 
sufficiently accretive to cash distributions per common unit, taking into 
account the existing levels of incentive distribution payments being made 
to our general partner.”
126
  Embedded in the MLP’s partnership agreement, 
the IDR reset option is typically exercisable by the general partner after 
four consecutive quarters of distributions at the 48% IDR level (50% if 
including the general partner’s 2% interest).
127
 
Under the provisions of the reset, the new minimum quarterly 
distribution will be the average of the two quarterly cash distributions 
preceding the IDR reset election.
128
  Furthermore, the new target 
distributions will represent 115%, 125%, and 150% of the reset minimum 
quarterly distribution.
129
  As an example, assume the new minimum 
quarterly distribution is $1.00.  Therefore, the first target distribution would 
be $1.15 (115% of $1.00), the second target distribution would be $1.25 
(125% of $1.00), and the third target distribution would be $1.50 (150% of 
$1.00).  Just like the first IDR iteration, the general partner would roughly 
receive 2% of distributions less than or equal to $1.15, 15% of the cash 
 
 123.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 504 (including an explanation of the decision to 
cap its distribution made by Enterprise’s CEO in which he referenced a reduced “cash cost 
of capital, which should enable us to provide our limited partners with greater economic 
returns on capital investments”). 
 124.  Id. at 505; see also Goodgame, supra note 21, at 98 (stating that institutional 
investors owned approximately 31% of all outstanding MLP equity as of March 21, 2012). 
 125.  See DCP Midstream Partners, LP, Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 61–63 (Dec. 2, 
2005) [hereinafter DCP Midstream Prospectus] (describing DCP Midstream Partners’ IPO 
and the general partner’s right to reset the IDRs and the general partner’s compensation 
resulting from the reset). 
 126.  Phillips 66 Prospectus, supra note 44, at 65. 
 127.  See id. (stipulating that this right inures to the general partner as the holder of the 
IDRs and is not subject to approval by “our unitholders or the conflicts committee”). 
 128.  See id. at 66 (“[f]ollowing a reset election, the minimum quarterly distribution 
amount will be reset to an amount equal to the average cash distribution amount per 
common unit for the two fiscal quarters immediately preceding the reset election”). 
 129.  Id. 
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distributions between $1.15 and $1.25, 25% of the distributions between 
$1.25 and $1.50, and 50% of all distributions over $1.50. 
However, unlike Enterprise Product Partners’ voluntary 
elimination of IDRs, an IDR reset election does not occur without 
contractual compensation to the general partner.  A standard IDR reset 
clause provides for the issuance of Class B common units to the general 
partner as compensation as well as the issue of enough general partner 
shares to maintain the general partner’s interest at 2%.
130
  These newly-
issued common units will throw off cash equal to the average of the IDR 
payments to the general partner in the two previous quarters.
131
  Therefore, 
the number of Class B common units the general partner receives will be 
the average quarterly IDR payments divided by the average quarterly cash 
distribution to the common units — both numbers being an average of the 
two preceding quarters.
132
  For example, if the general partner received an 
average of $5 million per quarter stemming from its IDR ownership and the 
average cash distribution per common unit was $.50, the number of Class B 
common units the general partner would receive for the reset would be ten 
million ($5 million divided by $.50).  Often times, these Class B units are 
convertible to common units after a defined period of time, typically one 
year.
133
  Though this compensation is clearly dilutive of the common 
unitholders, a general partner is likely to exercise this reset only if doing so 
facilitates growth for the MLP through a substantially accretive investment 
that will increase the cash distribution to the common unitholders in both 
the short- and long-term.  It is important to realize that the reset does not 
change the immediate cash flow to the general partner, but rather reduces 
the future cash flows, which affect future distributions.
134
 
The maintenance of IDRs with situational modifications to 
accommodate accretive acquisitions is a persuasive mechanism for MLPs 
in that the interests of general partners (i.e., parent-sponsors) and limited 
partners are economically aligned.  This conceptual framework aligns itself 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See DCP Midstream Prospectus, supra note 125, at 62 (providing that “[e]ach 
Class B unit will be convertible into one common unit at the election of the holder of the 
Class B unit at any time following the first anniversary of the issuance of these Class B 
units.”). 
 134.  See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 101 (stating that “the GP would 
receive a lower percentage of incremental cash flow at the reset (higher) MQD than the 50% 
of incremental cash flow that it would receive under the initial distribution schedule.  Hence, 
by resetting the incentive distribution tiers, the MLP’s cost of equity is effectively 
reduced.”).  For a detailed accounting depiction of an IDR reset, see EVEP and the IDR 
Reset, MLP PROTOCOL, http://mlpprotocol.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/evep-and-the-idr-
reset.pdf. 
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with “contractarian” legal scholarship, which aimed to undermine the 
widely-held belief that the corporate form was the ideal entity type for 
large firms.  In the context of MLPs, which have successfully operated 
under contractual constraints rather than corporate law frameworks for over 
twenty-five years, a theory favoring “uncorporation” seems not only 
plausible, but preferable.
135
 
C. Theory of Uncorporation Manifested in Conventional MLP 
The late legal scholar Larry Ribstein defined “uncorporate” 
business as including partnerships and LLCs.
136
  Ribstein witnessed 
firsthand the advent of publicly traded “uncorporate” entities — namely 
partnerships like MLPs and private equity firms.  In advocating for these 
entities’ viability and optimality for certain large firms, he identified three 
key aspects of “uncorporate” entities that made them adequate substitutes 
for, if not better than, C corporations with respect to “fiduciary duties and 
other traditionally corporate mechanisms for ensuring managerial 
accountability.”
137
  These three aspects are:  (1) mandatory distributions; 
(2) managers as partners; and (3) limited duration followed by mandatory 
liquidation.
138
  Simply put, these features should operate to reduce agency 
costs associated with “ineffective corporate-type monitoring devices.”
139
  
MLPs commonly exhibit two of these traits:  mandatory distributions and 
managers as partners.  Considering that many of the largest MLPs are 
composed of primarily midstream assets (e.g., pipelines) and have IDRs, an 
argument exists that these “uncorporate” facets are a contributing factor to 
MLPs’ tremendous performance compared with the market.  By way of 
example, a comparison of return on investment between Alerian’s MLP 
Index (AMZ) and the S&P 500 was conclusively in MLP’s favor.
140
  AMZ 
experienced an annualized return of 15% compared with S&P’s 7.4% over 
the last ten years and an investment of $1000 would have grown to $4058 
with AMZ compared with $2043 with S&P.
141
 
 
 135.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing four articles written by Ribstein). 
 136.  Ribstein, Uncorporation, supra note 8, at 125. 
 137.  See Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 290–92 (comparing 
corporations and partnerships with respect to distributions, liquidation, and manager 
ownership in the firm); see also Manesh, supra note 84, at 564 (identifying three 
uncorporate governance devices from Ribstein’s book “Rise of the Uncorporation”). 
 138.  Manesh, supra note 84, at 564. 
 139.  Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 290. 
 140.  See Alerian MLP Index Fact Sheet, ALERIAN, http://www.alerian.com/wp-
content/uploads/AMZfacts.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (comparing Alerian’s index of 
fifty prominent MLPs with the return on other investment vehicles available in the market). 
 141.  Id. 
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The first “uncorporate” aspect prominent amongst MLPs is the 
existence of mandatory distributions, or, in more appropriate terminology, 
required distribution of all “available cash.”
142
  Conceptually, limiting the 
discretion managers have to retain earnings reduces the need to monitor 
managers’ use of “free cash flow.”
143
  In MLPs, “free cash flow” is more or 
less defined as “available cash,” which must be distributed to unitholders.  
The discretion that MLP managers have to retain cash for capital 
expenditure purposes is patently different from the same determination 
made by a corporate board.  MLP managers, often appointed by the general 
partner who is controlled by the MLP’s sponsor, are incentivized to 
distribute as much as possible due to the IDRs that serve to enhance the 
general partner/sponsor’s share of cash flow.  As a result, managers of 
MLPs invariably do not have sufficient cash on hand to fund accretive 
acquisitions, which forces them to seek investment from the capital 
markets.
144
  Therefore, the theory follows that an efficient capital market 
will serve as a monitor for MLP management and will impute higher costs 
of capital for management inefficiencies. 
The effect of “compelled distributions” has been attacked as 
“dubious” since MLP managers have the discretion to determine what 
constitutes “available cash.”
145
  It is alleged that the implication of 
discretion is inescapably contradictory to mandatory distributions.
146
  Yet in 
the same vein, it is conceded that IDRs create an incentive to maximize 
these “compelled distributions,” but also create perverse incentives to 
“aggressively increase distributions” and in doing so “driv[e] the firm to 
riskier investments and acquisitions” at the expense of “prudently retaining 
earnings and managing distributions to maximize long-term value.”
147
  In 
the first instance, managerial discretion is the evil, and in the second, the 
absence of managerial discretion is the shortcoming to mandatory 
distributions.  How can it be both?  Rather, what is missing is the 
understanding that though many MLPs are vehicles for growth and have an 
 
 142.  See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (describing minimum quarterly 
distributions and MLPs’ contractual mandate to distribute all available cash); see also supra 
note 8 and accompanying text (unveiling Ribstein’s thesis of uncorporation). 
 143.  Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 290; cf. Michael C. Jensen, 
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
(Papers & Proc.) 323 (1986) (defining free cash flow and suggesting the use of debt to 
eliminate agency issues arising from managers’ misuse of free cash flow).   
 144.  Manesh, supra note 84, at 565; see Ribstein, Uncorporation, supra note 8, at 128 
(“Unlike corporate managers, uncorporation managers cannot rely on a permanent cache of 
equity capital to fund their ventures.  Their need to keep seeking funding ensures that their 
activities will be continually monitored by the capital markets.”). 
 145.  Manesh, supra note 84, at 590. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 591. 
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incessant need for capital, they are nevertheless “low-growth firms”
148
 in 
that they are often invested in fixed-fee, “steady cash flow” assets like 
pipelines rather than more speculative, exploration and production assets.
149
  
This characteristic of most MLPs makes their depiction as risky 
investments more dubious because the entity is not likely to make the 
investments absent near assurance that its cash flow will generate sufficient 
cash to justify the cost of capital.
150
  Finally, to the extent that the general 
partner (owned by the sponsor) derives economic benefit from mandatory 
distributions, the limited partners will benefit in kind with greater 
investment return — the economic interests of the parties are inescapably 
intertwined, incentivizing efficient management. 
MLP management is further connected to the financial 
performance of the entity through its ownership of partnership units — the 
second facet of uncorporate entities.  Many MLPs are constructed such that 
the general partner has a 2% equity interest, which is small in comparison 
to their control over the entity.  However, it is important to recall that when 
an MLP goes public, the vast majority of the common units authorized are 
kept by the sponsor and are defined as subordinated units, playing second 
fiddle to the common unitholders’ minimum quarterly distributions.
151
  
Therefore, in addition to the IDRs, an MLP’s parent/sponsor shares in the 
plight of the limited partners, exposing them to “the same upside potential 
and downside risks as their investors.”
152
 
Interestingly, several MLPs employ the sponsored MLP model, but 
lack IDRs or general partner equity interests.  However, the common bond 
they share is that their parent/sponsor maintains ownership of a large block 
of limited partner interests such that it is aligned with the common 
unitholders’ interests.  Enterprise Products Partners is the chief of these as 
the largest MLP by market capitalization.  Its parent/sponsor, Enterprise 
Products Company and its affiliates, own 36.4% of the limited partner 
interests in the MLP as of December 31, 2013.
153
  Simply put, the general 
partner is unlikely to engage in conduct that would sufficiently harm the 
 
 148.  See Ribstein, Uncorporation, supra note 8, at 128 (“This uncorporate device is 
better suited to mature, low-growth firms, which can set specific financial targets and time-
frames.”) 
 149.  See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502 (“[A]ssets typically owned or acquired by 
MLPs are ‘steady cash flow’-type assets and not more speculative, high-growth-type 
assets”)(footnote omitted). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Peacock, supra note 20 at 401 (“It is not unusual for the parent/sponsor to initially 
sell only a small portion (15-20%) of the total limited partner interests in the initial public 
offering and retain the rest.”); see supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that 
MLPs normally act as holding companies for “subsidiar[y]” LLCs, which own the assets.). 
 152.  Manesh, supra note 84, at 565. 
 153.  Enter. Prods. Partners, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 3, 2014).   
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economic status of the limited partners considering its stake as the sponsor.  
Considering the sponsor’s significant investment in the MLP, a “sell-
down” — an abrupt sale of a large holding of units into the market — by 
the sponsor could result in a significant drop in the value of the common 
units as the sponsor and MLP’s interests become less aligned.
154
 
The effect of mandatory distributions and manager ownership of 
the partner interests seem to serve as an excellent check on MLP 
management, ensuring the best investment outcome for common 
unitholders.  When general partners/sponsors and common unitholders 
have the same skin in the game, both parties can end up as winners.  The 
uncorporate entity embodied in MLPs supports this mutualistic 
relationship, as MLPs fare well in the market for investors and sponsors are 
able to monetize assets and generate steady cash flow for their role in 
aiding MLPs’ accretive growth. 
CONCLUSION 
Most recently, Kinder Morgan has added to the confusion over 
whether sponsored MLPs are viable long-term through its $70 billion 
reorganization, which folded its two MLPs into the “parent” C 
corporation.
155
  The reasons proffered for the extensive restructuring were 
the MLPs’ prohibitively high costs of capital and the need to lower the cost 
of capital to pursue more investments.
156
  It is possible that the Kinder 
Morgan consolidation will touch off a chain reaction of corporations 
acquiring the MLPs that they have developed through dropdowns.  The 
market response to Kinder’s consolidation has been largely positive thus 
far, though at the expense of the old MLPs’ unitholders, which were hit 
with a large tax bill as result of the deal.
157
  Though Kinder has removed 
itself from the MLP arena with this deal, it remains to be seen whether it 
will form MLPs in the future as it is now holding a plethora of qualifying-
income assets.  It would not be surprising to see Kinder drop new MLPs in 
the future to combat rising costs of capital at the corporate level, which is 
arguably the rationale for forming MLPs in the first place.
158
 
 
 154.  Goodgame, supra note 21, at 94. 
 155.  Brian Nelson, Kinder Morgan Consolidation: Not for the Reasons You Think, 
SEEKING ALPHA, http://seekingalpha.com/article/2517775-kinder-morgan-consolidation-not-
for-the-reasons-you-think. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Laura Saunders, The Bill Comes Due on Kinder Morgan MLPs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
29, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-tax-bill-comes-due-on-kinder-morgan-mlps-
1409335312. 
 158.  See discussion supra Part I.B (asserting that C corporations may utilize MLP 
dropdowns as a method of capitalizing the corporation at a discount compared with the cost 
of capital otherwise available to the corporation through the capital markets). 
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MLP governance is clearly going through a significant period of 
experimentation and flux as sponsors seek the best method to monetize 
their qualifying income-producing assets while still making the entity 
sufficiently accretive to prospective limited partners.  The maintenance of 
economic incentives improves the lot of both sponsors and common 
unitholders in that sponsors are encouraged to drop down assets that will be 
accretive long-term to the common unitholders in exchange for capital to 
reinvest elsewhere and a share of the assets’ future cash flows (i.e., IDRs). 
Though high-split IDRs are an unquestionable detriment to cost of 
capital, it is also clear that IDRs, if managed and restricted, can continue to 
be a boon to MLPs.  The IDR reset mechanism provides a method that 
compensates a general partner with further equity immediately in exchange 
for a smaller share of future cash flows, thereby reducing the cost of equity 
capital.  It has arguably become a best practice to include an IDR reset 
provision in MLPs' partnership agreements if the MLP utilizes IDRs to 
incentivize the general partner.  Flexibility for the general partner to 
decrease the cost of capital is not an evil for equity holders since the two 
parties are economically bound at the hip.  Furthermore, so long as MLP 
common unitholders continue to see market-besting returns, it is doubtful 
that they will look the gift horse that is sponsored MLP model governance 
in the mouth. 
 
